

1700, a U.S. Army OH-6 helicopter on a visual reconnaissance mission received enemy ground fire, crashed and was destroyed 21 miles northeast of Saigon in Bien Hoa Province. One U.S. was wounded in the action.

4. Yesterday morning at approximately 1000, a U.S. Air Force RF-4 while on an unarmed reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam, was fired upon by an enemy anti-aircraft artillery site located in an area five miles northwest of Dong Hoi in North Vietnam. U.S. Air Force F-4 escort aircraft conducted a protective reaction attacking the site with bombs. Results of the strike are unknown. There was no damage to the U.S. aircraft. (This is the 90th protective reaction announced this year. Note: Protective reaction #90 called out yesterday evening was in error. This was a repeat of protective reaction #89 which was reported in yesterday's communique. The reason for this error was a misreading of the target location coordinates which made it appear as a separate protective reaction very close to protective reaction 089 in time and location.)

5. Yesterday, ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet reported firing at enemy targets located in the southern half of the DMZ.

LAOS

6. Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S. Air Force B-52's, continued air operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. In addition, U.S. aircraft flew combat missions in support of Royal Laotian forces in Laos.

CAMBODIA

7. Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S. Air Force B-52's, continued air operations against enemy forces and their lines of supply and communications in Cambodia.

TROOP REDEPLOYMENT

8. Six U.S. Army detachments: the 236th Medical Detachment, the 346th Aviation Detachment, the 261st Field Artillery Detachment, the 83rd Medical Detachment, the 5th Quartermaster Detachment, and the 53rd Quartermaster Detachment have commenced stand down as a part of troop redeployment. Personnel within these detachments will be reassigned within the Republic of Vietnam or returned to the United States using normal returnee procedures. The approximate total number of space reductions is 100.

Memorandum to correspondents.

Subject: Weekly status reports—Aircraft losses.

Macot—Official U.S. aircraft losses in connection with the war in Southeast Asia through 7 March 1972.

Fixed wing aircraft:

Category I: 1,453 (one loss).

RVN: 937 (no change).

RNV: 434 (no change).

Laos: 82 (one loss).

Category II: 1,953 (2 losses).

Helicopters:

Category I: 2,176 (no change).

RVN: 10 (no change).

RNV: 2,068 (no change).

Laos: 98 (no change).

Category II: 2,547 (no change).

Definitions:

Category I—Combat type aircraft lost to hostile action while flying missions over either North Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, or since 10 March 1970, over Laos.

Category II—Combat type aircraft lost to non-hostile action, support aircraft losses, and other losses in connection with the war.

Starting dates for reporting aircraft losses:

North Vietnam—August 5, 1964.

Republic of Vietnam—January 1, 1961.

Laos—March 10, 1970.

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (AS OF MAR. 11, 1972)

	Missing	Captured	Total		Missing	Captured	Total
By country:				By service:			
North Vietnam.....	411	388	799	Army.....	353	75	428
South Vietnam.....	456	96	552	Navy.....	109	145	254
Laos.....	262	5	67	Marine Corps.....	90	25	115
				Air Force.....	577	244	821
Total.....	1,129	489	1,618	Total.....	1,129	489	1,618

STATISTICAL RECAPITULATION BY YEAR LOST

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	Total
Missing.....	4	54	204	226	294	176	85	79	7	1,129
Captured.....	3	74	97	179	95	13	12	11	5	489
Total.....	7	128	301	405	389	189	97	90	12	1,618

DECEMBER 8, 1971

No. 1026-71 C-232)
OXford 7-5331 (Info.)
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)

U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES—SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Department of Defense today announced the following casualties in connection with the conflict in Southeast Asia.

KILLED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

Army: California

SP4 Dennis R. STEWART, husband of Mrs. Mary A. STEWART, 2909 Occidental Drive, Sacramento, 95826.

Air Force: Maryland

Sgt. Thomas E. FIKE, son of Mr. & Mrs. Emerson T. FIKE, Friendsville, 21531.

DIED NOT AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

Army: Arkansas

SP4 Marvin R. KEETER, son of Mrs. & Mrs. Luther C. KEETER, Route 6, Fayetteville, 72701.

KENTUCKY

SP4 William T. WARREN, Jr., husband of Mrs. Joyce A. WARREN, 6315 Mount Evercst Drive, Louisville, 40216.

MISSOURI

SP4 Ronald REMBOLDT, son of Mrs. Mabel C. REMBOLDT, 1018 Jefferson Street, Union, 63084.

Air Force: Kentucky

CPT Charles P. RUSSELL, son of Mr. & Mrs. Lee R. RUSSELL, 813 Stanley Street, Hopkinsville, 42240.

FEBRUARY 26, 1972

No. 142-72 (C-287)
OXford 7-5331 (Info.)
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)

U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES—SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Department of Defense today announced the following casualties in connection with the conflict in Southeast Asia.

KILLEO AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

Air Force: Ohio

1LT Richard N. Christy, II, son of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Christy, Route 3, Marietta, 45750.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER, MESSAGE CENTER

UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCMLT399

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Action ASD:Pa: (25) J3: (04)

Distr CJCS (01) DJS(03) NMCC SecDef

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FM COM USMACV

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BT

Unclas (01)

Subject: MACV weekly summary release

number 69-72 of 9 Mar 1972

The following is a summary of significant items released to news correspondents INS Saigon at 1630H this date

Casualties—Military

Following are the casualty statistics reported during the period 27 February 1972 through 4 Mar 1972 to the Department of Defense by the Military Services during the week ending Saturday. Delayed reports and status changes for earlier weeks are included as they are received. Totals (shown in parentheses) are cumulative figures for Southeast Asia from 1 January 1961 through 4 Mar 1972

U.S.

5 (45,661) deaths resulting.

38 (302,745) total wounded.

14 (152,913) wounded (hospital care required).

24 (149,832) wounded (hospital care not required).

1,498 current missing/captured/interned.

9 (10,095) deaths not as a result of hostile action.

Missing not as a result of hostile action.

Following are U.S. losses in Laos as a result of action by hostile forces for the period 27 February 1972 through 4 Mar. 1972. All figures below are included in the totals on the preceding page. The "on ground" category refers to casualties to U.S. military personnel stationed in Laos. "Air operations" refers to casualties to U.S. military personnel incident to air operations over Laos. Figures in parentheses are cumulative totals since 10 March 1970."

AIR OPERATIONS

0 (100) deaths resulting from hostile action.

4 (279) total wounded.

0 (113) wounded (hospital care required).

4 (166) wounded (hospital care not required).

does not diminish U.S. involvement nor make it of less vital concern to us in Congress or to those whom we represent. The costs—the cost in people, the cost in resources drained, the cost in youth alienated, the cost in a country divided—should all be well known to each and every one of us.

The question is whether we are going to permit the secrecy and the news management and the concealment of facts to continue, or whether we, as Representatives, are going to demand that the executive branch fully inform the Congress and the American people.

In Southeast Asia itself, the examples of secrecy and news management are legion.

Sortie and tonnage figures per country remain classified, concealing the deep involvement of the United States in the massive air campaigns over Laos and Cambodia.

Statistics for the bombing of Hanoi and North Vietnam have recently been classified, allowing for further hidden escalations.

Reporters are not permitted to accompany spotter and attack planes on their missions over Laos and Cambodia, as they were in the past over South Vietnam, resulting in unreported civilian casualties and ecological destruction in Vietnam. Pilots, air attachés, and other personnel involved with the bombing of Laos and Cambodia are functionally inaccessible to newsmen, which again serves to censor independent accounts of the effects of the air war.

Aerial reconnaissance folders, some of them quite old, of areas designated as civilian sectors remain inaccessible to Congressmen and to newsmen. These photographs would reveal once and for all the extent of bombing of civilian areas so that we would have an understanding of what the massive application of airpower in Vietnam really has meant in the devastation of that country, which we are destroying in order to save.

The story of the captain, commenting upon a destroyed village in Vietnam some years ago, gave a very apt description of what the mission was, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it."

Only the sketchiest information is available on the costs of the air war and the relative amounts of the different types of ordnance used. The lack of such information obscures the costs and conceals the antipersonnel character of the bombing.

For almost a decade, a brutal war has been waged by our Government in the name of the American people. It is high time the public was told the truth about our disastrous involvement in this devastating conflict.

The passage of the resolution before us today would be a major stride in tearing the veil of secrecy from the war in Indochina and exposing it for what it really is.

How unfortunate it is that it is only now that the so-called Kissinger papers are being revealed. These papers—National Security No. 1—tell us, as the Washington Post editorialized this morning:

That by early 1969 only the very same people who had made most of the miscalculations which carried us up to March of 1968 with a big war and no solution still believed that the war in Vietnam was winnable in any practicable sense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military command in Vietnam and the diehards in the Saigon Embassy still believed this. But there was a considerable body of opinion that believed otherwise, that was prepared to support and reinforce a new, more realistic and more promising approach to Vietnam. By and large, the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the CIA believed:

That the North Vietnamese had the will and the resources to carry on the war indefinitely against unlimited bombing;

That the South Vietnamese showed little prospect of ever being able to conduct their end of the war without extensive American military support including the use of air power and combat troops;

That pacification wasn't working and showed little hope of working over the long haul;

That B52s were a doubtful asset except for close in tactical support of combat operations;

That there was something to be said for promoting accommodations on the local level, in the districts and villages and provinces, between the government people and the Viet Cong;

That neither this country's standing in the world nor the fate of Southeast Asia hinged on the outcome of the Vietnamese struggle.

Yet, while the President ignored the counsel of the National Security Memorandum, the American people and its representatives in Congress were not told that it even existed. This callous disregard of the people's right to know cannot be countenanced.

The basic issue is the imperative need for the Congress to heed the desires of the American people in bringing this war to an immediate end. Another death is one too many. Another day is one too much. It is time to give peace a chance.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.

I would like to call attention to the basic nature of the information being requested: How many men have we in Vietnam? How many times a government acting in our name has bombed another country? How many countries are we fighting in today?

It is a scandal that we, Congressmen—so-called legislators—have to go to the executive branch begging hat in hand for this sort of information. Must we always grope about in the dark, killing and maiming and wounding like a blundering giant, without even knowing it? Will this be our excuse when we are confronted with the consequences of our acts—"Well, we didn't really know what we were doing?"

Mr. Speaker, I look at the adverse report that the committee has kindly provided us with, and I see these phrases "in view of the fact," "since," "because of," and I think that these men we are going to see some reasons for the bizarre

refusal to provide this basic data. But no—all we see are mere repetitions of the same refusal. Does the Department of Defense think that all they need do is smile at us blandly and mutter "public interest," and we will go quietly away, saying, "Our master has spoken. We need not fear—surely he will take good care of us."

When the Nixon administration took office, we all hoped that they had learned from the mistakes of the previous administration.

And they have.

The previous administration seemed to think they had to convince us—and because they did not have a case, they lied.

They were found out in their lies, and what happened?—protests, accusation, a sense of betrayal.

Yes, the present administration has learned from this mistake: If you cannot say anything good, and you do not want to be caught in a lie—why, do not say anything at all. And then, when someone asks an inconvenient question, shake your head in a statesmanlike fashion and say, "If you only knew what I knew—how sorry you would be you were so unkind."

Mr. Speaker, we have to admit that sometimes democracy has a few inconveniences. One of these inconveniences is that if you want to carry out insane, illegal and immoral adventures on the other side of the globe, you will have to rip your own country apart in order to be able to do it. This inconvenience can be removed if we starve democracy of its life-blood, which is full and accurate information. But there is no fifth amendment for the Government—democracy depends on the Government being forced to give incriminating evidence against itself.

Mr. Speaker, our responsibilities are clear, it is time to live up to them. I am convinced that once the American people become aware of what is being done in their name—once they realize the demented and murderous way in which Yankee ingenuity, which they are justly proud of, is being used—they will want nothing so much as to stop this war as fast as possible.

Therefore, I am putting into the Record at this point information gathered with painstaking care from nonclassified sources by various groups on the outside. I think we Representatives should be shamed by these private citizens who must do our work for us.

And if those who identify the pride of powerful men with the enduring interests of this country feel that the careful conclusions of these observers is biased or misleading—why, let them reply, not with vague innuendoes and melodramatic accusations, but with precision, clarity, and rationality. Mr. Speaker, the information contained in these insertions is specific—let us have specific information in return, so that we have a basis for rational discussion, not blind and slavish trust.

One year ago this week, I served as chairman for a series of four ad hoc hearings concerned with the command responsibility for American war atrocities.

April 26, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 3581

war direction, but these need not concern us here.

For the next four years, as the Vietnamese effectively resisted French efforts to reconquer them, the U.S. was preoccupied with Europe. But in 1949 Washington decided—in the interests of the cold war—to support France, though the then-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, has since admitted Washington knew that the Vietminh exercised authority over most of the country. In his memoirs Acheson tells of French plans to "Vietnamize" the war—"to so weaken the enemy before reducing French forces in Indochina that indigenous forces could handle the situation." The French policy was thus one of mass extermination of Vietminh supporters—which meant most of the population—to permit imposition of the puppet Bao Dai regime upon the remnants without need for permanent large-scale French forces. Washington supported this, Acheson writes, though it realized that Bao Dai could never get enough popular backing to rule without French bayonets. This realization did not deter the United States from escalating material aid to France in her war to impose this regime upon the Indochinese people—in obvious contempt of the principles of independence and self-determination.

By February of 1954, mass Indochinese resistance and popular antiwar pressures in France forced the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference to agree to Soviet proposals for negotiations to take place at Geneva in May or June. We know now that Washington immediately proceeded to do all in its power to block the negotiations, and, after they had gotten underway at Geneva, to break them up. On March 6, less than three weeks after Berlin, the U.S. National Security Council determined that Washington had to take all possible measures to prevent Communist gains in any part of Indochina. Southeast Asia, the NSC said, supplied the "Free World" with vital commodities and was an essential trading partner for Japan. Its "fall" could undermine Japan's alliance with the U.S. And, according to the Council, Indochina was the key to Southeast Asia.

The NSC's position defined the policy which, with refinements, has shaped Washington's course in Southeast Asia up to the present. It also indicated two major concerns in shaping this course—U.S. control of the raw materials of Southeast Asia, and preservation of Washington's dominant political and economic influence in Japan. Only six weeks before the NSC's policy statement, a Presidential Commission on Foreign Economic Policy had delivered a report which emphasized that U.S. dependence on foreign sources of raw materials was constantly growing, and that these sources—and private investments in developing them—had to be protected. The report noted that more than half of the nation's consumption of zinc, lead, antimony, manganese, bauxite and chrome, and practically all its nickel, tin, natural rubber and jute had to be obtained abroad. [Since the National Security Council, President Eisenhower, Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles based their subsequent pleas for military intervention in Indochina on this report, and since students of U.S. involvement in Vietnam have overlooked it, it is useful to quote from the published staff papers out of which the report was composed.] The "transition of the United States from a position of relative self-sufficiency to one of increasing dependence upon foreign sources of supply constitutes one of the striking economic changes of our times," the report declared. It was thus "essential that foreign sources of scarce materials needed for defense remain in friendly hands." A second imperative for U.S. security was that "countries which occupy a key geographical position in our system of defense

remain friendly to the United States." Japan was cited as the "case in point," and Japanese trade expansion was cited as essential to her remaining "friendly" to the U.S.

The National Security Council policy determination of March 6, defining the U.S. position toward Indochina, was thus a direct outgrowth of this Presidential Commission report. On April 7, [a month after the NSC decision and some ten weeks after the Commission report,] President Eisenhower summed up "the strategic importance" of Indochina. "First of all," he said, "you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs." Two materials supplied by Indochina that were "very important," he observed, were "tin and tungsten." Others included "the rubber plantations and so on."

A week earlier, in a speech before the Overseas National Press Club in New York which indicated Washington's determination to prevent any meaningful negotiations at the forthcoming Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles said:

Southeast Asia is the so-called "rice bowl" which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is rich in raw materials, such as tin, oil, rubber and iron ore. It offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources of raw materials. The area has great strategic value. [Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and least-developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia.] It has major naval and air bases . . . Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action.

Note the phrase "by whatever means." The Eisenhower Administration knew then that 80 percent of Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh, and Dulles was clearly stating that this made no difference; the U.S. would permit no settlement at Geneva and no self-determination for the Vietnamese.

On April 16, in an address which received world-wide attention, Vice-President Nixon declared that the situation in Southeast Asia was most critical to the U.S. and that he would favor sending in U.S. forces if the French pulled out of Indochina. Its chief importance, he declared, lay in the fact that it was vital to Japanese commerce and its "loss" would make Japan a satellite of the Soviet Union. In the light of Nixon's persistent efforts to prove support of his present policies by a "silent majority" in the U.S., and his persistent pleas for adherence to the rule of the majority, it is ironic to note that he declared for sending U.S. troops to Indochina with or without the support of public opinion which, he insisted, was "uninformed." Nixon confessed that if the French stepped out, the Vietminh would control all of Indochina within a month.

The Eisenhower, Nixon and Dulles statements marked the initiation of an intensive effort to get Churchill and congressional leaders to agree to U.S. military intervention on the side of the French. But the congressional mood, sensitive to public reaction after Korea, was against intervention and the British commonwealth nations—reflecting Asian desires generally—wanted an end to the war. When Washington realized in May that it could not block a settlement at Geneva, the National Security Council called for modification of the U.S. position. Partition of Vietnam was demanded, with the south "to be retained at all costs." This became the active principle of U.S. policy at Geneva and after Geneva, and it remains so today.

I am not here suggesting that Washing-

ton's intervention in Indochina was motivated solely by a desire to control the raw materials of Southeast Asia, or to prevent Japan from slipping out of her economic and political grip, though these aims were most influential in shaping Washington's direction in 1954. The question is certainly more complex. There is, for example, repeated emphasis on the "domino theory," as well as the statement attributed to John Foster Dulles soon after the date for Vietnamese unification had passed, cited in the reprint before you: "We have a clean base there [in Vietnam] now, without a taint of colonialism. Dienbienphu was a blessing in disguise."

I have in mind, too, ex-President Johnson's description of all U.S. postwar foreign policy, made in his first post-presidency apologia for his foreign policy, in which he described its aim as maintaining a system in which the U.S. could "move and trade and live in freedom." The implications are not difficult to grasp. American economic and political power is so enormous today that it will inevitably dominate wherever it penetrates, and any nation seeking to protect itself against this penetration become by definition a threat to the free world. Material interests and considerations of alleged national security have been inseparable throughout America's history and they have operated inextricably in relation to Indochina. Nor were domestic political considerations entirely absent in determining Washington's course in 1954. The essential point here is that it is a cynical falsehood to state, as President Nixon has done, that the U.S. is in Vietnam solely to repel aggression and permit self-determination in the south. No living individual knows better than he how false that is. For our purposes here, the historic facts concerning the actual motivation for U.S. policy in 1954 underscore its illegality within the framework of the UN Charter. The reasons given for the U.S. course in 1954—whether those advanced by the Eisenhower Administration with respect to raw materials control, etc., or those advanced by Johnson with respect to U.S. business freedom in other lands—are plainly contemptuous of UN Charter guarantees.

During the Geneva Conference in Washington dredged up Ngo Dinh Diem from his exile in the U.S. and persuaded the French to make him premier of the puppet Bao Dai regime. It sent General William Donovan, Chief of the Office of Strategic Services, and C.I.A. counterinsurgency expert Edward Lansdale to Saigon to impose Diem upon the South. With the British it presented a 7-point memorandum to French Premier Mendes-France which Eisenhower later characterized as Washington's "minimum terms" for agreeing to a settlement, though he confessed that the U.S. as a non-belligerent had no right to meddle. The terms included: partition of Vietnam; "securing" the southern half for the west, with no political arrangement permitted which would give the people there the right to choose Vietminh leadership; and no limitation on the import of arms and military "advisers" to "protect" the South.

We know, of course, that the Geneva Conference explicitly rejected each of the above terms in its provisions for 1956 elections for a single all-Vietnam government, and for barring importation of arms and military advisers. But a month before settlement was even arrived at, Washington had already prepared the groundwork for putting its own partition scheme into effect, regardless of Conference decisions or the desires of the southern Vietnamese.

To avoid isolation, however, the U.S. was compelled to bow to allied pressures and to pledge at Geneva that it would not disturb the accords, explicitly stating that it did so because of its obligations under Article 2,

Lao zones encompass an area the size of New York state, or about two-thirds of the country. They are composed of 3-4,000 tiny villages, each consisting of a few dozen bamboo homes, a pagoda, rice storehouses, a few hundred head of water buffalo, cows, pigs, chickens, and ducks, and inhabited by some of the poorest, most gentle, rice farmers in Southeast Asia.

Each day for the last several years, hundreds of millions of dollars of the world's most sophisticated aircraft have been hovering over these villages: O1E, O2, and OV10 spotter planes at 2,000 feet; A1E, A26, T26 prop bombers, AC47, AC54, AC119, AC130 gunships, flare ships, rescue and gunship helicopters at 5,000 feet; F4, F100, F105, A7, B57 jet bombers, jet reconnaissance, EC47 and EC119 electronic aircraft at 10,000; KC135 supertankers at 20,000; B52s at 30,000; EC130 command and control aircraft at 35,000; and SR71 reconnaissance aircraft at 70,000 feet.

Giant computers, seismic and acoustic sensors, infra-red devices, and ANAPQ108 radar (designed to see through trees) have been tracking squat Soviet-built trucks or farmers trying to grow rice at night; laser-guided bombs and TV-guided missiles have been loosed on buffalo, trucks, rice storehouses, homes, and peasants alike. More than two million tons of ordnance have been dropped, \$5-\$10 billion spent.

"By the admission of American officials closely associated with the war there, Laos has been the most heavily bombed country in the history of aerial warfare."—The Washington Post, May 23, 1971.

Hundreds of case histories of bombing casualties have been recorded on film and tape in the refugee camps. Several thousand refugees, several hundred defectors, and Western observers who have visited these zones all report constant bombing of towns and villages and widespread destruction.

Each one of the refugees interviewed from both northern and southern Laos said that his village was either partially or totally destroyed by American bombers while he still resided there, or that beginning in 1969 the planes came "like the birds," as one old man put it, "and the bombs fell like the rain."

All refugees and defectors say the guerrilla soldiers avoided the villages, neither bivouacking in them nor storing arms and ammunition in them. All say that the vast majority of the casualties from the bombing were civilian and not military, as the soldiers were out in the forest and could not be found.

A significantly high number of casualties are children and old people. When asked why, refugees explain that the children like to "play around" too much and get caught in the open and, confused with terror, do not make it to the holes. Old people "often could not hear well or could not run fast enough," one chief of a Plain of Jars sub-district explained. He also said that most of the casualties were due to anti-personnel bombs dropped in or near the villages, but that napalm, fragmentation bombs, and 500-pound bombs were also frequently dropped. "During 1969 about 45 per cent of the people, mostly old people and women, never left their trenches or caves at all. They were too afraid. The others would go out and do their work if they didn't hear the planes coming."

Various press reports suggest that the same kind of bombing is going on in guerrilla-controlled zones of Cambodia. Population estimates for these zones begin at one million. The air war is still relatively new there, and as a result, refugees who have lived for long periods of time in guerrilla areas have not yet come into friendly regions. But private interviews with informed American sources indicate that the bombing of civilian targets in Cambodia is as extensive as in Laos.

One of the most heavily bombed areas has been the Plain of Jars, located in northeastern Laos and controlled by the Pathet Lao since 1964. If Khe Sanh and My Lai were the symbols of American ground intervention during the 1960s, the Plain is the symbol of the automated war of the 1970s.

In the Plain, once Laos' most prosperous area, there were no American ground combat troops. As former Ambassador W. H. Sullivan told the U.S. Senate in April, 1971, the area was not related to the security of American ground forces in South Vietnam. American-supported Asian troops were likewise doing little fighting there.

George Chapelier, a Belgian U.N. advisor, has described what occurred: "... in 1969 ... jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society."

In September, 1969, CIA-supported Meo troops went in and took out the remnants of what remained. Some 25,000 refugees were removed.

The Plain of Jars is today a deserted wasteland.

"Sure, some of the villages get bombed, there's no other way to fight a war out here, for God's sake. It's a war, and the civilians have to suffer. We did it at Cherbourg, didn't we?"—L. Hafner, Deputy Director, USAID/Laos, January 4, 1971.

"All refugees talk about the bombing. They don't like [it]. But even if you found an example in which it was proven conclusively that houses were bombed, so what?"—J. Williamson, USAID refugee relief chief, Vientiane, February 2, 1971.

While American officials concede that villages are frequently bombed, they tend to attribute this to Air Force "stupidity," "confusion," or "overkill." There is little doubt, however, that American policymakers also share the responsibility. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Dooley has testified to Congress that in Laos "all United States operations, including our air operations, are controlled by the U.S. ambassador."

All indications are that the American ambassador has approved strikes against civilian targets in Pathet Lao zones. As Robert Shaplen has written in *Foreign Affairs*, an American goal has been to "destroy the social and economic fabric in Pathet Lao areas," in an attempt to weaken the communists' stronger ground army by depriving it of indigenous food supplies, disrupting communications, killing off potential recruits or porters, demoralizing the civilian population, and causing a refugee flow to friendly zones.

Informed sources indicate that this has largely been due to pressure from the CIA, which is heavily involved in targeting American bombing strikes in Laos. The CIA has its own photo-reconnaissance team, reconnaissance aircraft, and ground observers in Pathet Lao zones. Together with Air Force personnel, CIA representatives participate in weekly meetings at Udorn Air Force Base in Thailand to draw up target listings.

Largely because of its direction of the Armee Clandestine, an indigenous paramilitary force, the CIA, sources say, has consistently placed inhabited villages on the target list in an attempt to weaken the Pathet Lao.

It is certainly clear that the American embassy has taken few steps to enforce the Rules of Engagement (military rules of warfare that prohibit attacks on civilians). To this day, only one junior Foreign Service officer has been assigned to check proffered target listings. Virtually no mechanism has been established to monitor strikes, and there are no known instances of disciplinary

action being taken against pilots for bombing civilian targets in Pathet Lao zones, although a few have been punished for strikes on friendly villages.

"Now the cabinet is in deep discussion of a series of proposals by General Henri Navarre, commander in chief in Indochina, that the war be increasingly turned over to the Vietnamese themselves, permitting France to reduce the burden on its manpower and economy."—Life, August 3, 1953.

The bombing of villages results most fundamentally from a 25-year-long American refusal to allow guerrilla forces to come to power in Indochina.

Richard Nixon's first public admission on April 17, 1971, that withdrawal hinges on keeping a noncommunist government explains the reliance on bombing.

For Asian ground armies alone will hardly accomplish what 550,000 American troops could not. The ARVN, whatever its improvement in the last five years, remains riddled with corruption, elitism, and poorly motivated conscripts. As their raping, looting and indiscriminate shelling of towns has shown in Cambodia, they have yet to master the most elemental rules of ground warfare in Indochina. Their failures in Laos, and their loss of 54 posts in the "pacified" Mekong Delta during the first four months of 1971, have surprised few old Indochina hands.

The Lon Noi army, although its soldiers' courage is often admirable, has made little headway, even with ARVN help. The guerrillas now control from 60 to 70 per cent of Cambodia.

The Royal Lao Army and CIA-directed Armee Clandestine in Laos are even weaker. With the communist capture of the Bolovens Plateau in May of this year, the Royal Lao government now controls little more than the major towns.

And the Royal Thai army is something of a standing joke in South Vietnam. Assigned to guard one corner of Long Binh base, its major accomplishment to date has been mastering the complexities of the black market.

At this writing, Asian troops are essentially playing a supplemental role: serving as live bait to lure the enemy out into the open for the bombers, as in the February, 1971, Laotian invasion; searching for enemy supplies, as in the A Shau valley; taking out refugees, as on the Plain of Jars; and guarding the major bases and towns. In any case, we risk Vietnamization because we do not have to rely on it. We rely on the bombs.

"Me Ou was 59 when she died on February 20, 1969. It was a cold day and she decided to leave the trench about 3 p.m. to get some clothing for herself and the children. The jets bombed while she was in the house. She was burned alive."—Me Ou's son-in-law, Plain of Jars.

Domestic pressures generated by the ground war have also played a part in the shift to air. The Vietnam ground war costs more in money and in lives. The American people will not continue to pay the price that has already come to \$100 billion spent, 50,000 dead, 300,000 wounded—nor will the troops, who are now in grassy-headed revolt.

The air war, however, provides few such problems. Although its cost is considerable, probably over \$10 billion annually, much of the money used for upkeep of air bases and development of new aerial technology would be spent even without the air war.

Charles Schultze, former director of the Bureau of the Budget, estimates that costs above normal upkeep of bases and production of aircraft are \$2-3 billion for 1972. And more important, U.S. casualties are minimal from the air. American pilots, freed from the discomforts of the ground war, and rarely seeing the people they kill, tend to raise fewer complaints.

April 1972

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technological developments from the air with increased ingenuity and resourcefulness.

It is Ho Chi Minh himself who is said to have remarked to a graduating class of sappers, the elite units of the North Vietnamese army, "You are our answers to the B52s."

The war in Indochina today has become primarily one of technology versus the human spirit.

"The biggest problem I had was to restrain my men's enthusiasm. If I asked for volunteers, all my men would argue to be the first chosen. 'Let me do it, they killed my mother!' 'No, let me go, they destroyed my village,' they would say. Were we afraid of the planes? Oh, no. If they stayed up high, they couldn't hit us. If they came down low, we could shoot them down. We were very angry. The planes didn't come to bomb the soldiers, they tried to kill the villagers. The villagers are just rice farmers. They didn't do anything against those pilots."—Pathet Lao defector, former captain.

The human spirit seems to be triumphing. Interviews with Pathet Lao defectors indicate that far from breaking the enemy's will, the bombing strengthened it. "Before, maybe only 20-30 per cent of the young men would volunteer to join the Pathet Lao army," explains one defector. "But by 1969, 90 per cent and more wanted to join. Nobody really understood what the Pathet Lao meant by 'American imperialism' before the planes came. But by 1969 the attitude was 'better to die fighting than hiding in the holes.'"

In an arena where American-supported ground forces are as lacking in motivation as they are, such sentiments on the other side are a key factor. At this writing, communist guerrillas are the only force in Indochina who believe they know what they are fighting for.

The influx of more than 30,000 refugees from heavily bombed areas during 1970 has made the bombing common knowledge in American-supported zones. Laotians of all political stripes are opposed to the bombings because it caused hardship to their fellow Laotians against whom they bear no enmity; and because they believe it widened the war. They blame Souvanna Phouma's government in part for permitting it. Conversely, they admire the Pathet Lao for standing up to it.

The war in Laos has always been for essentially political ends. The communists have made it clear they are not planning to take over the major towns militarily. The bombing has undoubtedly aided them in achieving a political victory. This may later be true of the other countries as well, making one wonder whether technology can keep up with the growing opposition to the U.S. in Vietnam, if we will resort to even more effective bombs to keep down more strengthened wills.

"I can assure you that my words are those of a devoted pacifist. My very hardest job is to give out medals of honor. If I lived in another country that wanted to be sure and retain its right to self-determination, I would say: 'Thank God that the United States exists at this moment of history.' We are not bent on conquest or on threatening others. But we do have a nuclear umbrella that can protect others. This is the moral force behind our position. We could be a terrible threat to the world if we were to lose that restraint."—Richard Nixon, interview with C. L. Sulzberger, The New York Times, March 10, 1970.

The issues raised by the air war go far beyond the personal culpability or motives of American leaders. For if the last few years have shown anything, it is that technological growth has a dynamic of its own, independent of the will of individuals. American leaders are more products of this process than its conscious manipulators, more the Man in the Grey Flannel Suit—or sometimes the Mad Hatter—than Big Brother.

The change in the Laos air war from a

limited number of prop bombers dropping 500-pound bombs outside of populated areas to hundreds of jet and B52 bombers using laser and TV-guided missiles does not appear to be the result of a series of carefully planned decisions. It was just part of ongoing technological development. The war kept up with the advances; each new improvement was put into action.

Dow, Honeywell, and Lockheed did their part; so did the Air Force, Marines, and Navy, the State Department and the CIA, Standard Oil and Gulf. The momentum was more powerful than the people within it; a belief in technology covered the horrors, much as a belief in religion protected the Inquisition. And without anybody really understanding or caring, thousands of Indochinese villages were destroyed in the process.

"The roar of the bombs and the noise of the planes frightened me terribly. Our life became like one of animals who search to escape the butchers. Each day, across the forests and ditches, we sought only to escape from the bombs. When looking at the face of my innocent child, I could not stop crying for his future. Why do the men in this world not love each other, not live together in peace, not build happiness in development and progress? Human beings, whose parents cherished them, died from the explosions of the bombs. Who then thinks about the affection and love their parents felt for them? As for the other men, do they know all the unimaginable atrocities which can happen here in this war?"—from essay by 35-year-old woman refugee from Plain of Jars.

The questions raised in this, the third year of the Era of the Blue Machine, really have less to do with men than Man.

What does it mean, after all, when the strongest of the species is systematically killing and maiming some of the weakest? . . . the most prosperous regularly destroying the homes and belongings of some of the poorest? . . . the most industrialized constantly devastating the land and food supplies of some of the most rural? . . . and the most technically advanced using their most sophisticated weaponry against a people who pose the most marginal of challenge to their interests?"

In a nuclear age such questions are of more than passing concern.

[From the Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 15, 1971]

BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL (By George Weiss and the Journal staff)

Allied Forces have for the past 2½ years been waging, with increasing success, a heretofore secret electronic war along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Current operations in Laos are providing a climactic test for the Pentagon's new sensor technology and could, as intended, break the back of the enemy's resupply effort and thus lead to a final denouement of the war itself.

Even more significant, in the opinion of several highly placed Journal sources, is the fact that a successful outcome to the Laos/Cambodia/I Corps campaign would be encouraging proof that, contrary to some opinion, the persistent and patient application of superior technology can be decisive in guerrilla war situations.

Here, as placed together from congressional, DoD, and other sources by Pentagon Editor George Weiss and other Journal staffers, is the real story behind the electronic interdiction program.

THE ELECTRONIC WAR

"We wired the Ho Chi Minh trail like a drugstore pinball machine and we plug it in every night." The Air Force officer who said that was not making an idle boast. Laos has been "bugged" with the most efficient electronic system ever devised. The real secret about the "secret war" is that this is one we may be winning.

The electronic operation began in December 1967. It has grown and been refined. What happens now may affect the future of every man in uniform in every nation in the world.

Warfare has gone electronic.

What it all means is just beginning to filter through. The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings in November. In late January a censored transcript was released, and for the first time the world got a look at the most classified war of all time.

The Laotian problem had ground rules imposed on it by almost everyone in government above the rank of general. For instance, no American was to fight on the ground in Laos. But, of course, it was agreed that if the infiltration of men and munitions could be slowed it should be. Just how that was to be accomplished was left to the military.

The classic military answer was to close the port at Haiphong. That solution never was politically feasible. The decision was to fight above Laos, harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, reduce the input—and don't get "involved" blockading or endangering Soviet, Chinese, and other shipping off Haiphong.

The following Journal exclusive gives, for the first time, the story of how the Ho Chi Minh trail was bugged and how the bugs help get the ordnance to the targets.

THE BINH TRAM EXPRESS

The distance from Mui Pass to the DMZ is 75 miles as the crow flies. The trail which covers that 75 miles and on into Cambodia is now more than 3,500 miles in length.

The Ho Chi Minh trail started out as a footpath. Today it is an insane maze of twisting, tangled roads, a rabbit warren. It wasn't planned that way. It developed.

As the Air Force bombed and closed roads, new ones were hacked from the jungle. As the trail became longer and more complicated, the NVA began to develop a system which the U.S. military refers to as The Pony Express. Cargo coming down the trail is passed from truck to truck. This occurs at truck parks and storage areas.

Located along the way are *Binh Trams* (military relay stations) staffed by engineers, transport workers, and anti-aircraft gunners. Each station crew has the responsibility of covering a portion of the trail on each side of its station, maintaining land telephone lines used in moving traffic, and keeping its portion of the road open.

The infiltration begins at nightfall, and by dawn the surviving vehicles must be off-loaded and their cargos hidden. The trucks may attempt to make it back into the sanctuary or may be directed to a hidden park where they will remain throughout the daylight hours.

Trucks bringing equipment into Laos are the largest. They carry eight tons of cargo. Trucks on the trail usually carry five tons. The smallest trucks are used for areas where speed is important and carry about three tons.

Speed on the Ho Chi Minh trail is a relative thing. Almost every truck moves in low gear. The explanation is quite simple: The operation (or 98% of it) is carried out in darkness on bad roads and without lights. Drivers cover only about a 20-mile portion of the trail each night. They are expected to know every turn and obstacle along their route.

From the Air Force point of view, the efficiency of the trail has been degraded as planned. A ton of munitions may now spend weeks and sometimes months in transit.

Each stop means the trucks must be unloaded and the cargos placed in caves or pits dug in the ground for protection against bombers.

IGLOO WHITE

The code name for the electronic operation is Igloo White. It was designed for fighting a war in hostile territory, offering the enemy absolute control of their surface ter-

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Security Affairs, described such character-
types on the basis of age, past negative ex-
periences with the Saigon authorities, eco-
nomic background, socio-economic frustra-
tions, education, and peer-group relation-
ships.] With the information provided by
such studies, the authorities have embarked
upon a program to intern, draft, or kill the
vulnerable character types. The problem
presented by the insurgents' appropriation
of government equipment has been met
largely through the improvement of ARVN
combat units, and the suspension of socio-
political programs in infected areas. To in-
hibit the insurgents' access to food, the
authorities have engaged in policy of crop-
destruction in NLF-controlled areas, while
in contested areas, a policy of food confis-
cation and limited distribution is being em-
ployed. [By the policy of limited distribu-
tion, it is hoped that the peasant population
will receive enough to survive, but lack any
surplus that they might willingly make
available to the insurgents.] The problem of
day-by-day support for the insurgent is most
easily handled. It involves the simple expedi-
ent of raising the costs of such support for
the population. Two of the best-known ex-
amples of this cost-raising are: the Army's
destruction of My Lai, and the CIA's Project
Phoenix. The former was a punitive op-
eration carried out against the villagers in
an area in which the NLF had recently been
active, while the latter, though much more
sophisticated in nature, were merely a puni-
tive program designed for the assassination
of low-echelon NLF collaborators.

The final aspect of the U.S.'s current coun-
terinsurgency strategy involves the elimina-
tion of the NLF's exogenous inputs. Since
the ouster of Sihanouk, the Cambodian port
of Kompong Som has been effectively closed
to the NLF. As a result, all of its exogenous
inputs now come from North Vietnam, chan-
neled through the Ho Chi Minh trail net-
work in eastern Laos and northern Cambo-
dia. Originally, U.S. strategy for reducing the
level of such inputs to the NLF consisted of
the interdiction of supply trails—that is, the
intensive aerial bombardment of the areas
through which the supply trails run. How-
ever, the number of trails involved, their
natural camouflage, and a terrain that was
unfavorable to aerial warfare reduced the ef-
fectiveness of aerial interdiction to nuisance
value. Faced with this fact, the Nixon gov-
ernment has embarked on a more direct ap-
proach—the U.S.-ARVN invasion of South-
ern Laos. This invasion has not only failed,
it has also sharply narrowed the U.S.'s avail-
able options in Southeast Asia. The crushing
defeats handed elite ARVN units like the
39th Rangers, in addition to disasters like
the forced evacuation of Sepon, will certainly
have damaged the morale of the ARVN.
The invasion has only reiterated the reality
that the ARVN is not a match for main-force
NVA units. Given this reality, Nixon is faced
with only three alternatives: (1) he may in-
definitely maintain large numbers of U.S.
combat forces in Vietnam as a counter-force
to the NVA, and not expand the war fur-
ther—an option not guaranteed to win votes
in the 1972 elections; (2) he may abandon
his Vietnamization policy and withdraw the
remaining U.S. forces, knowing as he does so
that he leaves the Thieu-Ky regime to a
certain defeat; or (3) he may elect for a U.S.
invasion of North Vietnam—the objective
being the final elimination of both the NVA
and the NLF's exogenous inputs. In October
of 1970, Nixon made clear how far he was
prepared to go in the elimination of North
Vietnamese aggression. At that time he made
a statement "which puts the enemy on warn-
ing that if it escalates while we are trying to
de-escalate, we will move decisively and not
step by step."¹⁵

The likelihood is that Nixon will order an
invasion of North Vietnam—perhaps before

this article is printed. To let the war drag on
would cost him his Presidency. To withdraw
immediately would be to make himself the
"first President to preside over an American
defeat." It would also mean the probable
loss of Laos and Cambodia from the U.S.
camp; the loss of the Vietnamese off-shore
oil franchises; the loss of access to the Mc-
Kong River Delta development; and would
leave the U.S.'s staunchest Asian ally, Thai-
land, facing hostile governments along its
entire eastern border—governments that
might be inclined to assist that country's
own domestic insurgents. The only serious
objections to such an invasion that are likely
to be raised within the President's circle of
advisers concern the possibility of conflict
with China. Against such arguments will be
ranged the positions of two groups: the Pres-
ident's counterinsurgency experts who will
maintain that the on-site destruction of
North Vietnam is the only way to bring the
war to an end—before 1972; and the strategic
planners, who have for twenty years main-
tained the position that the time to deal
with China is now. [Whether or not China
would actually respond to a U.S. invasion of
the North is a matter of speculation. It would
hardly seem to be in her best interest to
engage the U.S. in a war which would al-
most certainly be nuclear, but the Chinese
have long been sensitive to the presence of
hostile forces on its immediate borders. Ad-
ditionally, the recent visit of Chou-en Lai to
Hanoi may be an indication of significant
Chinese commitment to the continued ex-
istence of North Vietnam.]

The final question that remains is this:
assuming that the Wolf-Kissinger-Nixon
counterinsurgency strategy is carried out to
its logical conclusion—the invasion of North
Vietnam—and assuming that it will not lead
to a war with China, is it a winning strategy?
Will it terminate the insurgency in South-
east Asia to such a degree that the South
Vietnamese government can be fairly said to
"control" its own territory? There is of
course, no way of proving the point, one way
or the other. But if one were to accept the
validity of the systems approach analysis of
insurgency movements, then one must agree
(however reluctantly), that if the organiza-
tion can be destroyed at its functional level,
then the movement will be destroyed. For so
long as an opposition movement is organized,
the organization is understood by the au-
thorities, and the authorities possess suffi-
cient force, then the opposition movement
continues to exist at the pleasure of the au-
thorities only. The only way in which au-
thorities who are using this approach can be
beaten, is if they either lack sufficient power,
or are themselves organizationally destroyed.
The United States has the former, while the
National Liberation Front of Vietnam can-
not do the latter.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See: Roger Hilsman; *To Move A Nation*;
New York; Dell Publishing Co., Inc.; 1964.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ General David M. Sharp (ret.); *The New
American Militarism*; *The Atlantic*; April
1969; p. 55.

⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, *State-
ment of Robert McNamara, Secretary of De-
fense, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in Support of FY 1967 Military
Assistance Programs*, "What should be the
Foreign Policy of the United States"; April
20, 1966; p. 79.

⁶ See: Sir Robert Thompson; *Defeating
Communist Insurgency*; New York; Frederick
A. Praeger; 1966; p. 122.

⁷ *Ibid.*; pp. 56-7; 123-6.
⁸ Hilsman; *To Move A Nation*; *op. cit.*; p.
527.

⁹ General William Westmoreland; "Coun-
terinsurgency"; *Tricontinental-11*; March-
April 1969; pp. 91-2.

¹⁰ Sec: Richard M. Nixon; "Asia After Viet
Nam"; *Foreign Affairs*; October 1967.

¹¹ Found in: Henry Kissinger; "Reflections
on American Diplomacy"; *Foreign Affairs*;
October 1966; pp. 37-56.

¹² Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, jr.;
*Rebellion and Authority: An analytic essay
on insurgency conflicts*; Chicago; Markham
Publishing Co.; 1970; p. 29.

¹³ *Ibid.*; p. 30.

¹⁴ Charles Wolf, jr.; *United States Policy
and the Third World*; Boston; Little, Brown
& Co.; 1967; p. 69.

¹⁵ Also see: Edward J. Mitchell; "Inequality
and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South
Vietnam"; *The RAND Corporation*; June
1967; pp. 1-23; (P-3610).

¹⁶ Wolf; *United States Policy*; *op. cit.*; p.
66; and Leites and Wolf; *Rebellion and Au-
thority*; *op. cit.*; pp. 96 & 156.

¹⁷ Leites and Wolf; *Rebellion and Author-
ity*; *op. cit.*; p. 35.

¹⁸ As quoted by: Daniel Ellsberg; "The
Murder in Laos—The Reason Why"; *New
York Review of Books*; March 11, 1971.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. SEIBERLING).

(Mr. SEIBERLING asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, I
yield to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. BADILLO).

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
support of House Resolution 918 and call
for its passage as an essential step to-
ward full assertion of congressional re-
sponsibility in determining the course
and extent of our involvement in the
Indochina war.

The information sought in this resolu-
tion is information that Congress and
the American people must have. It is
difficult to comprehend how an adminis-
tration which came to office with a
pledge to square with the American peo-
ple about the war in Vietnam could con-
tinue to shroud its conduct of that war
in secrecy and it is even more difficult
to comprehend why the Congress lets
the administration get away with it.

There is a crisis of confidence in Gov-
ernment today. It is present in every
corner of our Nation. I doubt that there
is one Member of this House who is not
aware of the skepticism and distrust
Americans have for their Government
these days.

If we are going to rebuild that confi-
dence, if our constituents are ever to be-
lieve in the things we say and do, then
we must strip away the secrecy and dou-
bletalk which characterizes so much of
what goes on here in the Nation's Cap-
ital. And there is no better place to start
than with the truth about the air war
over Indochina, for this war is at the very
root of our crisis of confidence.

I commend my friend and colleague
from New York (Mrs. ASZUG) for her
energy and initiative in pressing this
resolution and I urge its passage.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, I rise
in support of this resolution.

It is not that some of the information
is not available, but what is on trial here
is the credibility of the Congress of the
United States. The American people,

war during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, and the Vietnam tragedy. However, the fact that Vietnam occurred as a result of the same essential political premises as occasioned Korea should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the military strategies which have been developed and implemented in Vietnam make this conflict very much more important than just another "cold war" gone hot.

There are any number of facts about the military campaign in Southeast Asia that are well known, and often commented upon—among them that: the U.S. has dropped more bombs in Indochina than were dropped in the entire Pacific Theatre of World War II; that the U.S. has had over forty thousand of its young men killed in this war; that this has been the longest war in American history; etc. The list of facts to attest to the magnitude of the American effort in Vietnam is endless. Yet, even as the U.S. and its allies march into another "neutral" nation, we are left with the feeling that if there was ever a bottomless pit, this is certainly it. But viewing the magnitude of the efforts and the paucity of the visible victories leaves a series of unanswered questions. With all of this effort, why hasn't the war been won? Have the strategic planners gone completely insane? Are the U.S.'s military commanders total incompetents? And in the final analysis, is this kind of anti-guerrilla war in Asia feasible under any strategic conditions? To deal with these questions it would be necessary to consider the specific strategies that have been employed in the Vietnam war—and these usually haven't been adequately considered, at least not by "critics" of the war. This is largely attributable to the fact that most of the critics view the entire war as immoral and unconscionable—that is, it is a political conflict among the Vietnamese people, and should be settled as such, without the benefit of U.S. war technology. To the extent that some of the war critics are now beginning to deal with the strategies and tactics of the war, the tendency has been to examine those aspects of the strategy that would make the U.S. commanders culpable of "war crimes." They may very well be culpable, but it is still important to examine the general nature of the strategies used in Vietnam—important for three reasons. (A) The strategies have changed twice, a fact that is not generally appreciated; (B) there are many in the U.S., particularly radicals, who argue that the war has come home—that tactics developed in Southeast Asia are currently being practiced in the United States; and (C) a comprehension of the strategies currently being employed in Indochina serves as a very useful model for predicting the future of America's foreign policy, not only with the members of the client network, but also with the enemies of the network.

THE NEW FRONTIER AND AMERICAN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Among the changes that John Kennedy brought to U.S. politics in 1961, probably none was so far reaching as the changes in the relations of the U.S. and the "Third World." This revision stemmed from necessity rather than from style. The immediately preceding years had seen in the Third World, among other unfavorable developments: the success of revolutionary movements in Indochina (1954), and Cuba (1959); and at the time of Kennedy's accession, Algerian revolutionaries were bringing their liberation struggle to a successful conclusion. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that in 1960 U.S. policymakers viewed the changing situations throughout the underdeveloped world with a dismay that approached horror—not only because these revolutionary victories had added numbers to the "other side," but also because the new regimes that emerged were openly bent on promoting and aiding similar revolutions throughout the Third World.

In 1961, the view from the White House was that not only might such revolutions prove contagious, but that the U.S. was largely unprepared to prevent or terminate them. In 1961, Eisenhower's approach to defending the Empire was seen as both prohibitively expensive and basically impractical—that is, neither nuclear threats nor the use of World War II-type conventional force seemed a viable counter-force to organized and sophisticated guerrilla revolutionaries. In the aftermath of the CIA's Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, and the "almost" Pathet Lao victory in Laos in the same year, Kennedy was determined that the U.S. should develop and embark upon a strategy capable of inhibiting the spread and the success of guerrilla movements.

The strategy which grew out of this determination was to be known as "counterinsurgency," and in its most elemental form, Kennedy's counterinsurgency strategy amounted to a combination of: military; para-military; social; economic; psychological; and "civic action" operations, to be carried out by the U.S. and its clients against insurgency movements. ["Insurgency" is used here to refer to "all types of non-conventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary and similar personnel, organizations and methods . . . (It) includes acts . . . conducted for the purposes of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government." U.S. Army Field Manual, FM-31-16, *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, p. 3.] As Kennedy envisaged counterinsurgency, and as he integrated the strategy into his foreign policy, the military was not intended to be, or become, the primary factor. Rather, the strategy which he envisioned was based upon the belief that nationalist revolutions in the Third World were the direct result of the crushing socio-economic deprivations that existed in those areas. Kennedy wished for a strategy that would win for the United States—and its client regimes—the "hearts and minds" of the people. Thus the emphasis was to be placed on "benevolent" programs designed to ameliorate the worst of the deprivations, or more accurately what Washington perceived as the most pressing problems and conflicts. The U.S. military's role was to be restricted to the utilization of highly trained military specialists who were to serve as trainers and advisers to the national militaries in America's client network, thus saving the U.S. the immense cost of maintaining a large occupation force in crisis areas.¹

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN INDOCHINA

Among Kennedy's advisors there was some disagreement with this "hearts and minds" approach to counterinsurgency, notably on the part of economist Walt W. Rostow. From Rostow's perspective, such socio-political reform measures as Kennedy envisioned were not feasible in any situation in which there was an on-going insurgency movement. On the one hand, argued Rostow, such a situation was far too unstable to permit capitalist "growth" to proceed, and on the other, such reforms as might be affected would likely be subverted by an efficient guerrilla movement.²

In 1959, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) had renewed the liberation struggle in South Vietnam that had been suspended in 1954. By the first year of Kennedy's Presidency, the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem faced a perilous future, and it was clear that without sustained U.S. assistance his government would fall. Viewing this Vietnamese crisis, Rostow argued that only a large-scale commitment of U.S. combat forces could save the Saigon government, but Kennedy sided with his "hearts and minds" strategists and entrusted his Viet-

nam policy to Roger Hilsman's State Department Bureau of Research and Intelligence.

In response to the immediate NLF-guerrilla threat, the Kennedy government committed U.S. military and CIA advisers to train and assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The rationale for this military commitment, wrote Hilsman, was that Kennedy appreciated that if the other efforts of the U.S. were to succeed then the U.S. would have to be able to guarantee the physical security of rural and urban residents. If it could be demonstrated to the indigenous population that they could be effectively protected from the NLF, then the possibility would be enhanced that they would make the "choice of refusing to cooperate" with the enemy. In this manner, Hilsman reasoned, the guerrillas would be denied their most valuable resource—the rural population.³

The long-term, non-military aspect of the Kennedy program in South Vietnam was to institute a "system of government services and assistance" that would end the traditional isolation of the rural areas from Saigon—the intention being to transfer the dependence of the rural population away from the guerrillas to the central authorities. Thus, the de-emphasis of the role of the military in Kennedy's counterinsurgency strategy was clearly qualitative rather than quantitative. That is, their physical presence was considerable while their role was auxiliary.

While the practice of counterinsurgency was continuing in Vietnam, the development of the model was progressing in the United States. Tens of thousands of civilian and military officials were being sent through counterinsurgency centers at Fort Bragg (N.C.), Fort Gurlick (Canal Zone), Quantico (Va.), and the Industrial War College in Washington, prior to being posted abroad. As a supplement to government research and analysis centers, the Kennedy government distributed large counterinsurgency research grants, both to universities and private research centers in the U.S. Much as the Eisenhower administration had made use of the universities for nuclear research during the 1950's, Kennedy (via the Department of Defense and the CIA), promoted counterinsurgency studies at universities such as Columbia, Berkeley, American University, and Michigan State, (to name only the foremost). Private research centers were also to be the beneficiaries of this new military science. Scholars at the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and the Stanford Research Institute, became the government's primary civilian technicians in the field of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics. (The largest of these institutions, the RAND Corporation, is a private research center initially established to serve the Air Force. In recent years it has been expanded from weapons system-analysis to the world's largest counterinsurgency center. Its trustees are drawn from private industries, universities, and the media. Located in Santa Monica, California, RAND's staff includes hundreds of social, behavioral, and natural scientists, engineers, etc. "Most of its projects," according to Dartmouth's Lawrence Redway, "are begun under contract with the armed forces . . ." In all military projects, the RAND staff has access to the most classified of information, and the confidence of highest of the nation's leaders. For further information: Lawrence Redway, *Foreign Policy and National Defense*, (Palo Alto: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1969).)

By 1963, the Kennedy administration had created a "round-robin" type structure, employing both behavioral social scientists and the technicians of the physical sciences. Commenting on this alliance in his *American Power and the New Mandarins*, Noam Chomsky described it as one in which "engineers"

¹Footnotes at end of article.

construct "their bombs and missiles," while the behavioral social scientists design and implement "experiments" to test Third World peoples and their resources against newly-devised control mechanisms. Then, (as today), it was not uncommon to find a RAND social scientist or a Berkeley political scientist working alongside U.S. Army military advisory teams in the hamlets and rural villages of Southeast Asia. Nor was it surprising that secretly-funded CIA conduit foundations should have set up experimental control laboratories" throughout South America, utilizing the most liberal of social scientists to study security-related behavior patterns of the indigena, (i.e. American University's Project Camelot).

In spite of the government's emphasis on reform programs, and the encouragement of civilian groups and agencies in the counterinsurgency field, a possibly inevitable mutation of the strategy began to occur—particularly in the realm of practical application of the strategy. As counterinsurgency programs became an increasingly important part of the operations of the Department of Defense, and as spending on these programs continued to increase within the military establishment, military leaders began to reject the notion that theirs should be the secondary role in the strategy. As General David Shoup, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps has noted: Vietnam had become an area in which "top ranking Army officers wanted to project Army ground combat units . . . to test plans and new equipment." Thus, the military leaders at the Pentagon wished to do the things that Kennedy wished to avoid—turn the Vietnam war into an American war.

As Kennedy still saw the role of the U.S. military in less-developed countries, it was to be limited to an advisory and training function. The various national armies would then be at the disposal of the local U.S. Chief-of-Mission and his military experts. Or, as Robert McNamara expressed it:

"The United States cannot be everywhere simultaneously. The balance of forces and the variable alternatives which challenge us in the changing contemporary world can only be conquered with faithful friends, well-equipped and ready to carry out the duties assigned to them . . . The Military Aid Program . . . helps in maintaining military forces which complement our own armed forces."

This U.S. military role was advocated to Kennedy by two counterinsurgency experts: the State Department's Robert Hilsman, and the British Institute of Strategic Studies' Sir Robert Thompson.

These two strategists felt, as did Kennedy, that insurgencies, were internal matters which could never be completely defeated by the mere use of force. In their view, if the U.S. were to rely solely upon force in its campaign against the NLF, not only would the "infected population" be alienated from the Saigon regime but it might very well be made more sympathetic to the insurgents. [This alienation would result from the negative aspects stemming from the pursuit of a military solution—the destruction of rural resources, crops, civilians, etc.] The permanent defeat of the NLF, Hilsman and Thompson argued, could only be achieved by the application of political and social programs "to which military measures were subordinated." The actual situation in Vietnam, they had discovered, was one in which the U.S. advisers were applying a shot-gun approach; that is, they were directing the available military force indiscriminately against all areas in which the NLF was operative. Because of the over-extended and diffuse nature of this approach, the entire anti-NLF campaign was becoming less and less effective, as "the insur-

gency movement had infected all areas of the countryside."

In light of the power of the NLF, Thompson advised that if the U.S. were to avoid an imminent failure, it should withdraw the ARVN troops to whatever secure base areas then remained, and begin the construction of what he termed "strategic hamlets". A decade before, Thompson had advised the British Imperial General Staff that if it was to defeat the Malayan insurgents it would first have to secure a minimal number of base areas. In Vietnam, Thompson was even more convinced of the need for strategic hamlets. In his view, if the U.S. did not direct the Vietnamese campaign in that direction, all future efforts to defeat the NLF would be both expensive and ineffective.

This strategic hamlet policy was based upon what later became known as the "oil blot principle". The principle, as Thompson presented it, was that the U.S. and the Government of Vietnam (GVN), should select those areas, both urban and rural, with the fewest number of active insurgents and begin fortifying the villages and hamlets in the selected areas. [This would necessitate "starting small", for as Thompson noted in his *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, most of South Vietnam's rural provinces were under the effective control of the NLF.] Within these hamlets, the U.S. and GVN agents should concentrate their sociopolitical programs, and "priority in respect to security measures should be given to the more highly developed areas of the country." The concentration of U.S.-ARVN counterinsurgency measures in these select areas was not seen by Thompson as a loss factor. To the contrary, he maintained, there would be many occasions when the U.S. would have to accept the fact that the guerillas would maintain "control over remote areas" as a result of "infiltration across inaccessible borders". If the U.S. were prepared to accept this and initiate the process of securing its base areas, Thompson believed that there would then be an increased chance of implementing successful socio-political programs. Once these base areas were effectively controlled, the U.S. and GVN could begin the expansion of their counterinsurgency operations outwards, into the areas previously controlled by the NLF.

L. B. J. AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

In 1964, the obvious paralysis of the ARVN, (and the fact that it was being used more to further political ambitions of its individual generals than to fight the NLF), convinced Lyndon Johnson that the Saigon government would not survive without a massive increase in U.S. support and combat functions there. Such an extension of the direct military role of the U.S. was enthusiastically supported by such advisers as Rostow, national security expert McGeorge Bundy, and the Defense Department's McNamara. [According to Hilsman, it was essentially Rostow's argument that had persuaded the President on this course.] The rationale of this extension of the war was clearly stated by General William Westmoreland, when he said: "Everything a nation does—any nation—must be behind the protective shield provided by its military services." Thus, the U.S. combat role in South Vietnam, and the bombing of North Vietnam, were both intended as the "protective shield" behind which the Saigon government could embark on those stop-gap socio-political reforms intended to win for it the "hearts and minds" of its people.

In January of 1964, Hilsman left the government in opposition to the new direction being taken in counterinsurgency strategy, and with his departure the management of the policy was removed from the State Department to the Pentagon and National Security Council. [This managerial change was to affect not only the Indochina war, but largely marked the eclipse of the State De-

partment as a significant participant in foreign policy development and execution.] Military supervision of the U.S.'s Third World policy was consistent with Rostow's belief that in the final analysis, the U.S. military would provide for those underdeveloped countries which were "besieged by communist insurgency," the "security required for law and order, nation-building, and all those other requisite conditions of the 'take-off' stage of (capitalist) development and growth." Although the Johnson Presidency saw the commitment of U.S. forces in areas other than Southeast Asia, it was in his continuous and increasing allocation of combat forces in Vietnam, between 1964 and 1967, that he demonstrated his faith in the Rostow-Bundy-McNamara counterinsurgency strategy.

Although the Johnson government greatly increased the use of U.S. military force throughout the Third World, it nonetheless continued to try to use this force as a "protective shield." Despite the bullets, bombs and napalm—despite the bloody and expensive "search and destroy" missions—the primary objective remained, as it had been, under Kennedy, the stabilization of these client areas by means of selective improvements in sociopolitical conditions. [To be sure, improvements that were to result from such nations experiencing a capitalist "take-off"—all fully consistent with the interests of the Metropolitan powers.]

The increased U.S. role in the shooting war increased the visible costs of Vietnam to the American people. The subsequent erosion of popular support for U.S. involvement, coupled with the psychological defeat suffered by the U.S. at the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, combined to cost Johnson the Presidency. His successor was to significantly alter the nature and tactics of counterinsurgency. Prior to his election, Richard Nixon had written an article in *Foreign Affairs* in which he described what he saw as being "Asia After Viet Nam."¹⁰ His vision revolved around the future lessening of the highly visible U.S. presence in the Far East—this to be accomplished in the long-run by encouraging America's Asian allies, particularly Japan, to take their places on the front lines of the Pacific Rimlands as a bulwark against future insurgent challenges to U.S. client control. What Nixon saw as being the short-range prerequisite to this goal was a successful conclusion of the Vietnam war—successful to the extent that it allowed the U.S. to create secure client governments in Saigon and Bangkok. This was, (and remains), the task of his new counterinsurgency program—the so-called "Vietnamization" policy.

In the years prior to Nixon's assuming office, there had been, on the part of a number of influential social scientists at private and academic research centers, a growing rejection of the "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency strategy of the Kennedy government, and of the indiscriminate "big stick" strategy of the Johnson government. These scholars were far more sympathetic to the positions enunciated by the new President's principal foreign policy adviser, Harvard's Henry Kissinger, who as early as 1966, had written:

"The problem of the uncommitted states cannot be solved . . . merely by an economic grouping of powers. It is related to the whole U.S. posture. Anti-Americanism is fashionable today in many parts of the globe . . . We should of course seek to allay legitimate grievances, but we would be wrong to take every criticism at face value . . . Popularity is a hopeless mirage in a situation which is revolutionary because old values are disintegrating and millions are groping for a new orientation. For this reason it is impossible to base policy solely on what people desire; a revolutionary situation is distinguished by its dissatisfactions, which join in protest against the existing order but which can

Footnotes at end of article.

propose no clear substitute. This is the reason why most revolutions have been captured by a small minority which could give a sense of direction to popular resentment. *In the uncommitted areas popularity may therefore be less important than respect.*"¹¹

These social scientists presented an analysis, dealing with the defeat of insurgency movements, that differed in several respects from the Rostow-Bundy-McNamara and the Hilsman-Thompson strategies. Essentially, while they accepted the contention that socio-economic deprivation creates political resentments, they argue that where an insurgency system of any magnitude existed it would have to be systematically destroyed before meaningful socio-political reforms should be undertaken. The scholar who has been most responsible for the new Nixon strategy is a systems analyst, Charles Wolf, Jr., of the RAND Corporation. [Since 1961, the going method of analysis in the Pentagon has been the quantitative approach. According to Morton Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, pp. 33-42, the quantitative approach incorporates two techniques as tools for investigation. The first one applied by defense strategists is defined as systems analysis. It is applied by an investigator who wishes to assess the effectiveness of military weapons and strategies as complete systems. The second technique is the cost-effectiveness comparative method—known in years past as the "biggest bang for the buck."]

ENTER THE NEW MACHIAVELLIANS

In two important, (and essentially ignored), works: *American Policy and the Third World*, and *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgency Conflicts*, [The latter co-authored by the University of Chicago's Nathan Leites], Wolf explicated the counterinsurgency strategy now operative in Southeast Asia. Wolf's analysis pictures insurgency movements as organized systems, competing with American power for the control of Third World states. Considering Indochina, Wolf advocates the application of high-profile, labor-intensive force by the U.S. and its allies against the insurgency organization. According to Wolf's strategy, it is both uneconomical and impractical to seek the allegiance of the indigenous population in the midst of an on-going rebellion. To introduce socio-political programs at such a time would, Wolf maintains, not only fail in its objectives, but ultimately be counterproductive. The new Wolf-Kissinger-Nixon strategy revolves around the use of force, and is based upon the postulate that groups behave "rationally: calculates costs and benefits to the extent that can be related to different courses of action, and makes choices accordingly."¹² As a result, the "influencing of popular behavior requires neither sympathy nor mysticism, but rather a better understanding of what costs and benefits the individual or the group is concerned with."¹³ The programs now being implemented in Vietnam to influence the costs and benefits to the population are based on the "primary consideration . . . (of) . . . whether the proposed measures are likely to increase the cost and difficulties of insurgent operations and help disrupt the insurgent organization, rather than whether it wins popular loyalty and support, or whether it contributes to a more equitable, productive, or efficient use of resources."¹⁴ This disregard for the socio-political programs of the "hearts and minds" strategists is not mere callousness. To the contrary, it is rooted in military-political realities. As Wolf argued, to introduce such socio-political programs concurrently with an on-going insurgency rebellion would only make available "inputs" available to the guerrilla, (i.e. food, supplies, materials, information, technology, etc.), which the in-

surgent would convert into yet more intense revolutionary activities. Thus, when computing the costs and benefits that are most likely to motivate the indigenous population to favorable political behavior, Wolf's Machiavellian strategy concludes that force and the threat of force, is by far a more effective counterinsurgency policy than are any attempts to win over the "hearts and minds" of an apathetic peasantry.

[In *Land Tenure and Rebellion: A Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Government Control in Vietnam*, a RAND Memorandum prepared for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, Edward J. Mitchell presents data substantially confirming Wolf's force vs. "hearts and minds" thesis. Mitchell concluded that the greater the "inequality of land tenure," the greater the degree of Saigon control in rural Vietnam. He based this conclusion on two factors, (1) the "docility and low aspirations of poorer peasants," and (2) "the enhanced power of the landlords in such areas."¹⁵

The specific tactics of Vietnamization have therefore become a matter of applying the costs and benefits approach in such a way as to maximally influence political behavior. The application of such tactics in Southeast Asia has resulted in the initiation of a sliding scale of violence: "confiscation" of a village population's chickens are a simple technique, suggested by Wolf, to make the population aware that aiding the guerrillas in any way is not in their immediate best interests. If the warning is not heeded, and support for the insurgents continues, then the "razing of houses" or the annihilation of an entire village is certain to make the point clear—and is a valid part of counterinsurgency. However, this application of force in Vietnam is not generally carried out in the same indiscriminate manner that Thompson had complained of in 1962. To the contrary, it is carried out in a highly discriminating manner—aimed all the while at the organization of the insurgency.¹⁶

Wolf had advised U.S. military planners to study insurgency movements in the same manner as a corporation studies a market competitor—that is, as having ultimately the same goals (control), and utilizing ultimately the same means (a highly organized manipulation of violence). Today his systems approach to insurgency is mirrored in the Pentagon strategy in Indochina. As the U.S.'s on-site executor of Vietnam policy, General Creighton Abrams, has recently contended, the primary role of the military in Vietnam must be the destruction of the enemy's system. (*Time*, Feb. 15, 1971.) In accordance with Wolf's advice, the U.S. is dealing with the NLF in functional terms—as an organization requiring "inputs," "conversion mechanisms," and utilizing the converted inputs as "outputs."

Thus the insurgency movement obtains its inputs from one of two sources: the "endogenous" (internally, from the local population); and the "exogenous" (externally, from sympathetic states in the international environment.) These inputs then go through the conversion process, which (involving needs such as training, storage manufacture, coordination, direction, etc.), is essentially dependent upon the insurgents' ability to secure and hold a base area, either within the crisis-state, or adjacent to it. Eventually these inputs will reemerge, typically as political and military activity having to objectives: the renewal of the internal support mechanism; and the subversion and overthrow of the local government.

Current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is designed to make the functioning of the insurgency system impossible. It is the realization of what the insurgency system in Southeast Asia amounts to, and consideration of what the U.S. will have to do, (and is doing), to destroy it, that makes the future of the war fairly predictable.

MARCHING TO HANOI

Dealing with the most immediate threat posed by the Vietnamese insurgents—violent outputs—the U.S. is continuing to upgrade the quality of the ARVN, while maintaining in the Southeast Asian area elite U.S. strike units: the Air Force, flying from bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, and aircraft carriers in the South China Sea; the Air Cavalry, stationed at bases along the Vietnamese coast; and the Third Marine Division, stationed on vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is the hope of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam that the ARVN will prove capable of handling threats from all but main-force North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. Backed by massive U.S. air and firepower, the ARVN seems to have made progress in securing the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts. [This is not to suggest that the NLF is no longer active in these areas—they are, and their 1970 attack on Dalat in the Central Highlands proves it. However, their level of military activity in these Districts has been scaled down significantly. The most successful NLF military activity now seems to occur in the northernmost First Military District—the area once known as I Corps.]

As insurgent military activities in most of South Vietnam now seem to have been brought within tolerable limits, the direction of the U.S.-ARVN efforts has been concentrated on the destruction of the remainder of the system—that is, the conversion mechanisms and inputs. Considering the conversion process, the U.S. strategists have been determined that the NLF is largely dependent in this respect on base areas in which it can prepare to carry out its military activities. These base areas were located in the more remote rural areas of Vietnam, and areas of lesser importance were situated along the eastern border of Cambodia. To ensure the destruction of these sanctuaries, the U.S. has engaged in a campaign which, among other things, has involved: the declaration that such remote areas were "free fire zones," (within which, everything that moves is presumed to be an armed enemy and is destroyed); a policy of defoliation, which has resulted in the deforestation of an area the size of Massachusetts; and the U.S.-ARVN invasion of Cambodia. The degree of success that this anti-conversion campaign has enjoyed is anybody's guess—there is simply inadequate information to provide the basis for intelligent conclusions. However, the CIA-assisted ouster of Norodom Sihanouk, and the subsequent invasion of Cambodia have already proved to be counterproductive. The new alliance in Cambodia, of pro-Sihanouk neutralists, Khmer Rouge insurgents, and Vietnamese Communists, have made that country the most seriously endangered by insurgents in the entire area.

In the long-run, the most dramatic and significant aspect of the new U.S. counterinsurgency in Indochina is the campaign designed to limit the insurgents' inputs. The strategy is concerned with both the endogenous and exogenous inputs, prescribing different treatments for each. The endogenous inputs are considered to be: peasant volunteers and draftees; military materials appropriated from the government; foodstuffs donated to, or confiscated by, the insurgents; intelligence and information supplied by the rural population; and, the day-by-day support and shelter offered by the peasantry. To limit the availability of volunteers and draftees, U.S. strategists have conducted extensive surveys dealing with the propensity of certain character-types to cooperate with the NLF. [One of the most inclusive of these studies, Frank Denton's, *Volunteers for the Viet Cong*, a RAND Memorandum prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International

Footnotes at end of article.